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Abstract 
Legal argumentation is a vital cornerstone of justice, 
underpinning an adversarial form of law, and 
extensive research has attempted to augment or 
undertake legal argumentation via the use of 
computer-based automation including Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). AI advances in Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) have 
especially furthered the capabilities of leveraging AI 
for aiding legal professionals, doing so in ways that 
are modeled here as CARE, namely Crafting, 
Assessing, Refining, and Engaging in legal 
argumentation. In addition to AI-enabled legal 
argumentation serving to augment human-based 
lawyering, an aspirational goal of this multi-
disciplinary field consists of ultimately achieving 
autonomously effected human-equivalent legal 
argumentation. As such, an innovative meta-approach 
is proposed to apply the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of 
AI Legal Reasoning (AILR) to the maturation of AI 
and Legal Argumentation (AILA), proffering a new 
means of gauging progress in this ever-evolving and 
rigorously sought domain.  
Keywords: AI, artificial intelligence, autonomy, 
autonomous levels, legal reasoning, law, lawyers, 
practice of law, argumentation, adversarial 
 
 
1 Background on Legal Argumentation 
 
Legal scholars and the legal profession overall have 
expended much effort and attention toward the 
formulation and analysis of legal argumentation [5] 
[31] [32] [42]. This focus on legal argumentation has 
entailed in-depth research and conceptual examination 
of what constitutes legal argumentation all told, along 
with the detailing of the day-to-day practical aspects 
concerning how to best undertake legal argumentation 
and how to gauge when legal argumentation is being 
accomplished well or performed poorly [10] [41] [46].  
 
Taking a brief side tangent for purposes of definitional 
clarity, there is pervasive ambiguity about the meaning 
of the phrase “legal argumentation” as to its exact 
definition and denotations. Likewise, the phrase “legal 
argument” also has varied connotations. To make this 
discussion relatively parsimonious, this paper 
considers that “legal argumentation” shall herein refer 
to the broadest scope of all facets involved in the act of 
argumentation within the field of law. Meanwhile, the 
phrase “legal argument” will be reserved for use when 
discussing a particular instance or sub-element within 
the umbrella of legal argumentation. It is hoped that 
this will enable the discussion to be more readily 
cohesive and consistent, doing so without any loss of 
substantive indication or impact. Even if the proposed 
demarcation is not of satisfaction to some, or could be 
seen as arguable unto itself, it nonetheless does not 
undercut or distill the essence of the discussion. Given 
that brief clarification, the discussion can now 
continue with that caveat so noted. 
 
Legal argumentation is reasonably viewed as a variant 
of generic argumentation [18] [68], suggesting that 
there is a macroscopic realm entailing 
“argumentation” of any kind or nature and that legal 
argumentation is an instantiation or incarnation of 
argumentation into the domain of law. Thus, there is 
the full spectrum of generic argumentation, out of 
which there could be argumentation applied in specific 
disciplines, such as the law, medicine, engineering, 
and the like. 
 
Some controversy exists over the question of whether 
generic argumentation is any different fundamentally 
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from the argumentation utilized within any particular 
domain or discipline. In other words, generic 
argumentation might be simply reused within the field 
of law, for example, and not be structurally or 
intrinsically any different due to the advent of its use 
in the legal domain. 
 
There are ongoing debates as to legal argumentation 
being essentially a subset of generic argumentation or 
whether it can be construed as a superset. If one asserts 
that legal argumentation goes beyond the realm of 
generic argumentation, presumably then it is the case 
that legal argumentation is a superset. If one asserts 
that legal argumentation is no more than the 
application of generic argumentation into the nuances 
of the law, presumably legal argumentation is a subset 
thereof. 
 
Whichever side of the debate one takes, it does appear 
that the efforts to explore, extend, and mature our 
understanding of generic argumentation provides 
insights for legal argumentation, and similarly that the 
efforts underlying the maturation of legal 
argumentation can be funneled into generic 
argumentation comprehension. As such, this paper 
takes no side on this question and merely notes its 
importance, synergistic effect, and ongoing 
consideration in such matters. 
 
One could sensibly claim that legal argumentation is 
more than merely one amongst equals in terms of the 
instantiation of generic argumentation. Of all the 
various disciplines that draw upon argumentation, 
legal argumentation has a most notable history and 
need for pushing ahead on extending what 
argumentation consists of and how it can be described 
and utilized. 
 
Legal argumentation is a vital cornerstone of justice, 
underpinning an adversarial form of law. This is not to 
imply that legal argumentation does not appear in and 
nor serves a crucial role in other forms of law, and 
merely is noted as especially required and to some 
degree revered when placed into an adversarial 
architecture. The adversarial approach places legal 
argumentation at the front and center of legal matters 
and therefore heightens interest and priority to the 
state of legal argumentation. 
 
To bolster legal argumentation, there have been efforts 
to dovetail the use of computer-based systems into the 
field of and the everyday acts of legal argumentation. 
In its simpler form, computers can be a storehouse 
from which legal argumentation can be undertaken by 
humans, and otherwise, the computer is serving as a 
modest aid in a rather mechanistic manner. 
 
The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has long 
sought to intermix with the field of Legal 
Argumentation, doing so to try and extend the 
computer capabilities to be a more powerful aid to 
humans involved in legal argumentation. Indeed, there 
is extensive research that has attempted to augment or 
undertake legal argumentation via the use of 
computer-based automation including especially the 
AI subfields of Natural Language Processing (NLP), 
Machine Learning (ML), and Knowledge-Based 
Systems (KBMS). 
 
An overarching aspiration for AI in the legal 
argumentation realm would be to have the computer or 
machine be able to autonomously perform some or all 
of the aspects of legal argumentation. Ultimately, 
achieving autonomously effected human-equivalent 
legal argumentation is a long-sought goal for those in 
this specialty of AI. Within the legal field, there has 
been a similar interest, and thus there is a decidedly 
multi-disciplinary effort involved in these matters. For 
those interested in technological capabilities, the 
attention tends to go toward developing AI that can 
perform legal argumentation. Also, there is a rightful 
concern and attention toward the societal implications 
of AI that could perform legal argumentation, 
including whether this would be considered a form of 
practice-of-law, and what implications this has for 
those seeking legal advice and those proffering legal 
advice. 
 
Returning to the synergistic aspects earlier mentioned, 
there is an ongoing dance, as it were, entailing the 
synergistic effects of generic argumentation with legal 
argumentation, and the synergistic effects of AI with 
both generic argumentation and legal argumentation. 
To emphasize, it is not as though AI is somehow a 
sideline aspect that is solely attempting to implement 
argumentation (of any kind). Instead, AI also 
contributes to the understanding of what 
argumentation consists of, and thus probes and 
provides substantive advancement to argumentation, 
whether it be for generic argumentation or the field of 
legal argumentation. 
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There is, in a sense, plenty of synergies to go around. 
AI as a field is inherently itself enriched by seeking to 
be an element of and contributor to generic 
argumentation and also of legal argumentation. This 
occurs on both a theoretical level of deriving new 
theories and conceptual gains and also on a practical 
basis of deploying usable systems. In short, it would 
seem that each field of inquiry is apt to gain by the 
deployment of the other into its focal of inquiry. 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to that aspiration and 
does so by proposing an innovative meta-approach 
toward applying the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI 
Legal Reasoning (AILR) to the maturation of AI and 
Legal Argumentation (AILA), proffering a new means 
of gauging progress in this ever-evolving and 
rigorously sought domain. 
 
Doing so provides a well-needed means of measuring 
progress in the aspiration of integrating AI and legal 
argumentation. Researchers and scholars can make use 
of the LoA AILR to AILA to assess progress in the 
theoretical and conceptual efforts of integration, while 
practitioners can assess the strengths, weaknesses, and 
progress in the deployment of such capabilities. This 
paper also provides a model known as CARE, namely 
Crafting, Assessing, Refining, and Engaging in legal 
argumentation, which outlines the core facets by 
which AI is integrated into legal argumentation. 
 
In Section 1 of this paper, the topic of legal 
argumentation is further introduced and addressed. 
Doing so establishes the groundwork for the 
subsequent sections. Section 2 introduces the Levels of 
Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning (AILR), 
which is instrumental in the discussions undertaken in 
Section 3. Section 3 provides an indication of the AI-
enablement of legal argumentation as it applies to the 
LoA AILR. The final section, Section 4, covers 
additional considerations and recommendations. 
 
This paper then consists of these four sections: 
• Section 1: Background on Legal  
                 Legal Argumentation 
• Section 2: Autonomous Levels of  
                        AI Legal Reasoning 
• Section 3: Legal Argumentation and  
                 AI Enablement 
• Section 4: Additional Considerations and 
                 Future Research 
1.1 Research on Legal Argumentation and AI 
 
As mentioned, legal argumentation is crucial to the 
field of law, and this is emphasized in the case of 
resolving legal disputes [9]: “Argumentation is 
particularly important in law: a legal case typically 
centres on a conflict between two parties which is 
resolved by each side producing arguments in an effort 
to persuade the judge that their side is right. The judge 
then decides which party to favour, and publishes a 
decision in which he argues why his decision is 
justified. Modelling legal reasoning can then be seen, 
to a large extent, in terms of modelling argument, and 
so it is unsurprising that attempts to understand legal 
argumentation have been a key strand in AI and Law.” 
 
Of course, legal argumentation has numerous other 
roles besides solely dealing with particular legal 
conflicts or disputes and permeates a wide array of 
legal activities and efforts. In addition, legal 
argumentation pervades the adversarial process [3]: 
“Legal reasoning usually takes place in the context of 
a dispute between adversaries, within a prescribed 
legal procedure. This makes the setting inherently 
dynamic and multiparty and raises issues of strategy 
and choice. For example, there is work on optimal 
strategies for adversaries in debates with an 
adjudicator, given their preferences over the possible 
outcomes of a debate and their estimates of what the 
adjudicator will likely accept.” 
 
There is much discourse regarding whether there is a 
potential unification theory that might someday be 
postulated to fully provide a complete semblance of 
legal argumentation in the law, of which there is doubt 
cast that such an all-encompassing theory is viable, as 
will be indicated next. 
 
Consider the pluralistic model of law, which can be 
depicted as [40]: “I accept the term ‘pluralistic’ for this 
descriptive model of legal argument because it reflects 
the fact that law arises from value choices made by 
different persons at different times and it 
acknowledges that there are different ways to 
determine what choices they made. Heads of 
administrative agencies, judges, legislators, and the 
people all make law. There are a variety of methods 
for interpreting the law they have made, and as a result 
our interpretations of the law are sometimes 
contradictory.” And as further stated: In their view, the 
law is not essentially a unitary system that can be 
4 
 
explained by a ‘grand unifying theory’ or 
‘foundational analysis.’ Instead, our system of law is 
characterized by the fact that multiple legitimate forms 
of legal arguments exist.” 
 
Some are seeking to mathematically or 
computationally model legal argumentation in the 
quest of seemingly embodying the law in an axiomatic 
way. There are serious questions expressed about the 
efficacy of these approaches in terms of making a key 
assumption that law is ultimately determinate and 
calculable. For example, as stated by [40]: “For 
pluralists, law is inherently indeterminate because 
valid but contradictory legal arguments potentially 
exist regarding the interpretation of the law.” 
 
Efforts to utilize rule-based non-monotonic logic-
based systems for modeling legal argumentation are 
also called into question [56]: “We also argued that 
‘traditional’ rule-based nonmonotonic logics (whether 
argumentation-based or not) are of limited use, and 
that the role of cases, principle, purpose and value 
should not be ignored, as well as the importance of 
dynamics, procedure and multi-agent interaction. This 
holds for the law but also for related areas such as 
policy making, group decision making and democratic 
deliberation. More generally, legal applications of 
logic confirm the recent trend of widening the scope of 
logic from deduction to information flow, 
argumentation and interaction.” 
 
Part of this can be attributed to what some suggest is a 
false belief that there are legal specifications that if 
only found or voiced would then allow for AI to be 
codified accordingly, as mentioned in [33]: “Although 
it is commonly accepted that legal decisions must be 
justified in a rational way, there are hardly explicit 
legal specifications as to what the justification should 
consist of. One of the important problems in the study 
of legal argumentation is which standards of legal 
soundness the argumentation should meet.” 
 
According to [33], it is vital to realize that legal 
argumentation consists of several components, 
involving philosophical, theoretical, reconstruction, 
empirical, and practice facets: “The philosophical 
component attends to the normative foundation of a 
theory of legal argumentation. In the theoretical 
component, models for legal argumentation are 
developed, in which the structure of legal argument 
and norms and rules for argument-acceptability are 
formulated. The reconstruction component shows how 
to reconstruct legal argument in an analytical model. 
The empirical component investigates the construction 
and evaluation of arguments in actual legal practice. 
Finally, the practical component considers how 
various results forwarded by the philosophical, 
theoretical, analytical, and the empirical components 
might be used in legal practice.” 
 
This though does not summarily discount the value of 
mathematical formulation for legal argumentation, 
noting that one should not necessarily discard the 
advantages out-of-hand and that such computational 
models can be of significant benefit [9]: “It is, of 
course, the case that similar issues underpin one well-
established and highly-developed theory: that of 
formal logic and mathematical proof. It is no 
coincidence that much of the formal computational 
treatment of argumentation has its roots in ideas 
developed from AI inspired contributions to logic and 
deductive reasoning. So one finds in mathematical 
proof theory core concepts such as: precisely defined 
means for expressing assertions (e.g. formulae in a 
given logical language); accepted bases on which to 
build theorems (e.g. collections of axioms); procedures 
prescribing the means by which further theorems may 
be derived from existing theorems and axioms (e.g. 
templates for inference rules); and precise concepts of 
termination (e.g. a sentential form is derivable as a 
theorem, ‘true’; or is logically invalid, ‘false’).” 
 
But legal argumentation still has extraordinary facets 
that require going beyond traditional mathematical 
formulations, of which the intrinsic element that legal 
argumentation necessitates of persuasion opens the 
matter further, accordingly [9]: “One can summarise 
the distinction between argumentation and proof by 
the observation that the object of argumentation is to 
persuade (to acceptance of a given claim; to 
performance of a desired action, and so on). Unlike the 
concept of ‘proof’—at the level of deriving a 
sentential representation of an assertion—whether an 
argument is “correct” is not a factor, and, indeed, 
“correctness” may not even be sensibly defined. In 
contrast, mathematical reasoning, in order to have any 
value, must be correct where ‘correctness’ has a strict, 
formal definition: beyond this requirement, however, 
notions of “persuasiveness” are unimportant.” 
 
Perhaps this is succinctly stated by the assertion in 
[49]: “But there is more to a legal argument than 
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reasoning or logic. Justices and attorneys bring an 
interpretive context, argumentative and rhetorical 
strategies, and other more general models of the 
domain and the world to an oral argument.” 
 
A distinction made by some researchers is that legal 
argumentation is not a pure logic-based effort and 
should be seen as one of more so rhetoric-based [40]: 
“Legal reasoning is not composed of deductive 
arguments framed for the purpose of proving the truth 
of a particular proposition but is a species of rhetoric 
designed to persuade others to accept a particular 
interpretation of the law. But how is the 
persuasiveness of a legal argument to be evaluated? 
What is the yardstick against which we measure the 
‘correctness’ of legal reasoning? There are two 
fundamental types of challenges to legal arguments: 
‘intramodal’ and ‘intermodal’ challenges. Intramodal 
critiques challenge legal arguments on their own 
terms, while intermodal critiques address the validity 
or weight to be accorded to each type of argument.” 
 
Per the research of [39], persuasiveness is indeed vital 
to legal argumentation: "Legal reasoning entails a 
practice of argumentation. The reasons given for the 
conclusions reached are to be measured by their 
persuasiveness, not by reference to some established 
true state of affairs.” 
 
Part of the conundrum underlying this ingredient of 
persuasiveness is that besides being difficult if not 
indeterminable to model, there are canons of 
construction related to the law that can essentially land 
on either side of a legal argumentation case. For 
example, Llewellyn made this point about the nature 
of opposing canons [45]: “As in argument over points 
of case-law, the accepted convention still, unhappily 
requires discussion as if only one single correct 
meaning could exist. Hence there are two opposing 
canons on almost every point. An arranged selection is 
appended. Every lawyer must be familiar with them 
all: they are still needed tools of argument.” 
 
Some examples of these opposing canons can be 
illustrative of this matter. Consider this one [45]: 
“1. A statute cannot go beyond its text.” 
And this corresponding and opposite one: 
 
“1. To effect its purpose a statute text may be 
implemented beyond its text." 
Similar examples in [45] demonstrate this same 
facility of the law and legal argumentation: 
 
“2. Statutes in derogation of the common law will 
not be extended by construction.” 
 
“2. Such acts will be liberally construed if their 
nature is remedial.” 
 
And this one about common law [45]: 
 
“3. Statutes are to be read in the light of the common 
law and a statue affirming a common law rule is to 
be construed in accordance with the common law.” 
 
“3. The common law gives way to a statue which is 
inconsistent with it and when a statue is designed as 
a revision of a whole body of law applicable to a 
given subject it supersedes the common law.” 
 
And so on, including even the role of punctuation [45]: 
 
“24. Punctuation will govern when a statue is open 
to two constructions.” 
 
“24. Punctuation marks will not control the plain 
and evident meaning of the language.” 
 
For adversarial legal reasoning, it has been postulated 
that there are three levels involved, namely the logic 
level, argument level, and dialogical level [55]: 
“Adversarial legal reasoning consists of three levels, 
the logic level (generates arguments), argument level 
(organizes argument, identifies attack relations, 
ascertain acceptability of the arguments for given 
points in a debate), the dialogical level (how 
arguments can be deployed in a dispute).” And that 
this can form the basis for constructing a legal 
argumentation framework [55]: “A three-level model 
is proposed, where a formal argumentation framework 
is built around a logical system and itself embedded in 
a dialectical protocol for dispute, in such a way that, 
each time a party adds or retracts information, the 
argumentation framework reassesses the resulting state 
of the dispute.” 
 
A notable aspect brings up the role of attacks related to 
legal argumentation. It is insufficient to undertake 
legal argumentation without also considering the 
importance and essence of attacks too. Attempts to 
model the variants of attack include formulations such 
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as denial of the premises, alternative action for same 
effect, side effects of an action, and so on. In work by 
[36], the details of fifteen forms of attack are 
described, though this is a starter list and the 
researchers mention as such: “However, we consider 
only the opening stages of an argument, leaving 
counter-attacks, shifts in the burden of proof, and 
similar issues to later work.” 
 
Research by Dung [18] has highlighted the importance 
of attacks in legal argumentation: “Roughly, the idea 
of argumentational reasoning is that a statement is 
believable if it can be argued successfully against 
attacking arguments. In other words, whether or not a 
rational agent believes in a statement depends on 
whether or not the argument supporting this statement 
can be successfully defended against the 
counterarguments. Thus, the beliefs of a rational agent 
are characterized by the relations between the 
‘internal’ arguments supporting his beliefs and the 
“external” arguments supporting contradictory 
beliefs.” 
 
In a means of thinking about legal argumentation, the 
adversarial approach has perhaps fueled or further 
bolstered the complexity of ordinary argumentation, as 
outlined by [56]: “All these aspects of the law, i.e., its 
orientation to future and not fully anticipated 
situations, the tension between the general terms of the 
law and the particulars of a case, and the adversarial 
nature of legal procedures, make that legal reasoning 
goes beyond the literal meaning of the legal rules and 
involves appeals to precedent, principle, policy and 
purpose, and involves the attack as well as the 
construction of arguments. A central notion then in the 
law is that of argumentation.” 
 
There is also the need to realize that multiple agents or 
actors are potentially involved in legal argumentation. 
This in turn rachets up the complexities [56]: “From 
this analysis it appears that different kinds of agents, 
with different functions engage in legal reasoning in 
different contexts: the addressees of the norms (the 
citizens), the producers of the norms (the legislators), 
the appliers of the norms (the judges and 
administrators), and the enforcers of the norms (the 
administrators/police officers). The reasoning forms 
employed in the law may thus not only depend on the 
nature of the issue addressed but also on the context in 
which the reasoning takes place.” 
 
AI researchers tend to describe argumentation models 
as being classified or known as COMMA 
(Computational Models of Argument), and that a 
cornerstone includes the use of Argumentation Mining 
(AM) [37]: “The goal of argumentation mining, an 
evolving research field in computational linguistics, is 
to design methods capable of analyzing people’s 
argumentation.” Furthermore, AM is still an evolving 
field [37]: “Despite the lack of an exact definition, 
researchers within this field usually focus on analyzing 
discourse on the pragmatics level and applying a 
certain argumentation theory to model and analyze 
textual data at hand.” There is also the use of 
Argument Markup Language (AML), such as in the 
case of the Araucaria system, leveraging elements of 
XML accordingly: “The argument markup language 
(AML) defines a set of tags that indicate delimitation 
of argument components (loosely, propositions), tags 
that indicate support relationships between those 
components, and tags that indicate the extent of 
instances of argumentation schemes. The design of 
AML builds on results in the theory of argument and 
its application in AI, and therefore, although similar in 
spirit, is significantly different from earlier attempts.” 
 
Per earlier emphasis, there is not as yet any unifying or 
unitary theory that has been explicated that could 
shore-up these varied methods and approaches [69]: 
“As yet, there is no unitary theory of argumentation 
that encompasses the logical, dialectical, and rhetorical 
dimensions of argumentation and is universally 
accepted. The current state of the art in argumentation 
theory is characterized by the coexistence of a variety 
of theoretical perspectives and approaches, which 
differ considerably from each other in 
conceptualization, scope, and theoretical refinement.” 
 
No singular discipline or specialty is likely to gain 
notable ground if it does not remain open to other 
allied disciplines in the cross-boundary multi-headed 
tentacles of legal argumentation [33]: “The study of 
legal argumentation draws its data, assumptions and 
methods from disciplines such as legal theory, legal 
philosophy, logic, argumentation theory, rhetoric, 
linguistics, literary theory, philosophy, sociology, and 
artificial intelligence. Researchers with different 
backgrounds and from various traditions are 
attempting to explain structural features of legal 
decision-making and justification from different points 
of view.” 
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Recall too that legal argumentation is not an island 
unto itself and that it presumably in one way or 
another inextricably entangled with generic 
argumentation. Note this point about persuasion in 
argumentation as mentioned in 1917 by Ketcham [44]: 
“The art of persuading others to think or act in a 
definite way. It includes all writing and speaking 
which is persuasive in form.” And, going back to 1898 
and the work of MacEwan [47]: “Argumentation is the 
process of proving or disproving a proposition. Its 
purpose is to induce a new belief, to establish truth or 
combat error in the mind of another.” 
 
These underlying elements are acknowledged in 
today’s AI effort towards encompassing even generic 
argumentation embodiment, since any AI, even that 
outside of the legal realm and for any nature of human 
intelligence purposes, must facilitate argumentation 
[70]: “The field of artificial argumentation plays an 
important role in Artificial Intelligence research. The 
reason for this is based on the recognition that if we 
are to develop robust intelligent machines able to act 
in mixed human-machine teams, then it is imperative 
that they can handle incomplete and inconsistent 
information in a way that somehow emulates the way 
humans tackle such a complex task.” 
 
As stated concisely [70]: “Humans argue. Machines 
should be able to argue too if we aim to achieve mixed 
teams in a hybrid society.” 
 
Turns out that the legal field, because of its intrinsic 
requirement for argumentation, provides a valuable 
testbed for developing AI overall, as revealed in a 
review of the AI field in this regard [56]: “As can be 
seen from this review, the development of logical 
models of legal reasoning nowadays proceeds mostly 
within AI & law and is very much driven by real 
examples and applications. We think that the latter is a 
fortunate development, since it shows that the law is a 
rich testbed for AI theories of reasoning and 
argument.” 
 
Upon furtherance of this point, the richness of legal 
argumentation and its keystone role in law are added 
benefits to the attempts at applying AI [56]: “Law is of 
vital importance to society, promoting justice and 
stability and affecting many people in important 
aspects of their private and public life. Creating and 
applying law involves information processing, 
reasoning, decision making and communication, so the 
law is a natural application field for artificial 
intelligence. While AI could be applied to the law in 
many ways (for example, natural-language processing 
to extract meaningful information from documents, 
data mining and machine learning to extract trends and 
patterns from large bodies of precedents), the fact that 
law is part of society makes logic particularly relevant 
to the law.” 
 
And, continuing [56]: “Since law has social objectives 
and social effects, it must be understood by those 
affected by it, and its application must be explained 
and justified. Hence the importance of clarity of 
meaning and soundness of reasoning, and hence the 
importance of logic for the law and for legal 
applications of AI. This review aims to introduce AI 
researchers to the law as a rich testbed and important 
application field for logic-based AI research, with a 
particularly marked concern for logical models of legal 
argument.” 
 
One subtle but significant aspect of legal 
argumentation is that it cannot normally be done in a 
hidden or obscured manner, namely that the 
expectation is that legal argumentation will be 
explainable and interpretable. As mentioned in [7]: 
“Legal decisions must be justified. In law, the answer 
is not enough: the reasons for the answer must be 
given in order to guide future decisions, to ensure 
consistency of decisions, and to attempt to persuade 
the losing side of why they lost, perhaps leading to 
acceptance of the decision.”  
 
Another consideration is the defeasible nature of the 
law and thus its impact upon legal argumentation [7]: 
“Law is defeasible. Legal rules can be overturned by 
finding that an exception applies, or by finding a 
conflicting law, or by distinguishing the case so that 
the rule does not apply.” 
 
Recent efforts of AI applied to argumentation include 
the IBM Project Debater system [5], which makes use 
of argument clustering, argument summarization, and 
the mapping of arguments to key points underlying an 
argumentation. In addition, when coping with a new 
situation involving an unrehearsed argumentation 
session, there is the use of “first principles” of reusing 
prior debates or prior arguments to enact a de novo 
argument synthesis [10]. 
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Do not though somehow be led into imagining that 
argumentation is nearly solved, which it is most 
decidedly not, and likewise nor is legal argumentation.  
 
As aptly stated in [9]:  “Most significantly, however, 
that the body of theory, techniques, and applications 
we have discussed is very far from encompassing a 
final, definitive description of the scope and limits of 
what argumentation-based approaches can offer to the 
furtherance of AI as a scientific discipline: many 
questions remain unresolved, many avenues 
unexplored, and many applications offer a wealth of 
possibilities for future work. When people participate 
in reasoned debate they are engaging in argumentation 
not demonstration. Thus argumentation, rather than 
logical demonstration, should be seen as the core 
technique for justifying claims.” 
 
There is a dearth of AI-enabled legal argumentation 
systems for today’s use by the legal profession [3]: 
“While the theoretical advances on models of legal 
argument have been impressive and a number of 
valuable prototype systems have been developed, no 
systems have been deployed in everyday practice yet.” 
 
A somewhat daunting concern is that the ability to 
have AI fully operate in any substantive autonomous 
manner as to legal argumentation might be equivalent 
to the AI problem in its entirety of achieving human 
intelligence capacities [3]: “Developing artificial tools 
that capture the human ability to argue is an ambitious 
research goal, and it may ultimately prove to be as 
difficult as developing AI in general.” 
 
Meanwhile, various attempts at structuring legal 
argumentation and the modeling of legal 
argumentation continue, of which some are noted next. 
 
One viewpoint is that there are three pillars involved in 
AI argumentation facets: “The three pillars of the 
development of argumentation-enhanced intelligent 
machines are, from my point of view: (i) modeling and 
reasoning on socio-cognitive components like trust 
using computational models of argument which are 
able to deal with incomplete and conflicting 
information, (ii) mining argument structures in natural 
language text to detect, e.g., potential fallacies, 
recurrent patterns, and inner strength, and (iii) 
analyzing and understating the role of emotions in 
real-world argumentative situations (e.g., debates) to 
inject such information in the computational models of 
argument to better cast incomplete and inconsistent 
information when emotions play a role.” 
 
One indication is that there are three approaches 
overall [33] “In the past 30 years three more or less 
consistent approaches to legal argumentation can be 
distinguished: the logical, the rhetorical and the 
dialogical approach.” 
 
As recently pointed out in [3], the earlier work by 
Dung was especially insightful since it illuminates the 
importance of abstraction in legal argumentation: 
“Dung’s insight was that arguments could be abstract 
and this freed them from any particular method of 
generation, whether using a particular logic, particular 
argument schemes, or case based methods. Once in the 
framework all arguments were equal. This separated 
consideration of the status of arguments from the logic 
that produced them.” 
 
In exploring how humans undertake legal 
argumentation, the work by Huhn [40] postulates that 
there are five types of legal argumentation: “Five types 
of legal argument exist: text, intent, precedent, 
tradition, and policy. Each type of argument may be 
considered an information set or a category of 
evidence admissible to prove what the law is.” And 
these are respectively based on differing concepts of 
the law and justice [40]: “Each type of legal argument 
is based upon a different conception of justice; that is, 
a different source of the law. The first four types of 
legal argument are of ancient lineage, while the fifth, 
policy analysis, has been expressly acknowledged as a 
valid legal argument only in the twentieth century.” 
 
In terms of what is meant by the fifth type, the policy 
analysis, here’s the indication provided [40]: Policy 
analysis proceeds in two steps: a predictive statement 
and an evaluative judgment. The court first predicts 
the consequences that will flow from giving the law 
one interpretation or another and then decides which 
set of consequences is more consistent with the 
underlying values of the law. In attacking a legal 
argument based on policy analysis, one may challenge 
either the predictive statement of consequences or the 
evaluative judgment. Policy analysis can be contrasted 
with each of the foregoing sources of law. Rather than 
requiring the court to ascertain the value choices made 
by others, policy analysis invites the court itself to 
make a policy choice by balancing all of the relevant 
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values and interests affected by the decision to pursue 
a particular policy.” 
 
Finally, before concluding this section of the paper, it 
is perhaps noteworthy to consider an ongoing question 
underlying law schools and the training of lawyers, 
which offers insights into the nature of legal reasoning 
and human intelligence, all of which are essential to 
the discussion of legal argumentation. 
 
Per the provocative commentary in [40]:  
 
“Students enter law school expecting to learn ‘the 
law,’ that is, rules of law. They conceive law to be a 
science, a set of determinate rules that govern 
human behavior. Moreover, students are frustrated 
when law professors insist the principal purpose of 
legal education is not learning rules of law, but 
rather learning ‘to think like lawyers.’ What exactly 
does it mean ‘to think like a lawyer?’  ‘To think like 
a lawyer’ is to be adept at legal analysis; it is to be 
able to predict, argue, and decide what the law is in 
hard cases. The purpose of legal education is to train 
students in the mastery of this skill.” 
 
The next section of this paper introduces the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning, doing so to 
then aid Section 3 then explores how legal 
argumentation automation varies across the levels of 
autonomy. Section 3 also covers more introspection of 
the AI intertwining with legal argumentation. Section 
4 provides some conclusionary remarks and also an 
indication of recommended future research. 
 
 
 
2 Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [24].  
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with key elements of autonomy and as 
matched to AI Legal Reasoning. Providing this context 
will be useful to the later sections of this paper and 
will be utilized accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
2.1 Details of the LoA AILR 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
2.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
2.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, the access to online 
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legal documents that are stored and retrieved 
electronically, and so on. 
 
By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
 
2.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
2.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
2.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-
based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [19] [20] [21].  
 
Essentially, this entails any AI legal reasoning 
capacities that can operate autonomously, entirely so, 
but that is only able to do so in some limited or 
constrained legal domain. 
 
2.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
 
2.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
11 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
 
 
3 Legal Argumentation and AI Enablement 
 
In this section, the advent of AI and legal 
argumentation is explored in several respects. First, a 
model coined as CARE for Create, Assess, Refine, and 
Engage is introduced and provided as context for AI 
Legal Argumentation (AILA) facets. The  Toulmin 
formalism for argumentation is next showcased and 
discussed, including augmentation that considers the 
importance of attack vectors, horizontal layers, vertical 
layers, and recursion. This is followed by an 
examination of hard cases versus clear cases, 
providing a four-square quadrant for case difficulty 
comparison purposes. A persuasion cloud that 
represents a legal argumentation search space is next 
shown and used to illustrate the process of identifying 
a winning argument all told. Finally, typing together 
the Section 1 and Section 2 discussions, a chart is 
provided that indicates the maturation of AI Legal 
Argumentation along with the Levels of Autonomy 
(LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning (AILR). 
 
A series of figures are included in the discussions to 
aid in illustrating the matters addressed. 
 
3.1 AI Legal Argumentation and CARE 
 
A model coined as CARE for Create, Assess, Refine, 
and Engage is shown in Figure B-1. This reflects the 
key activities or processing that an AI-enabled Legal 
Argumentation (AILA) system would be expected to 
perform. The wording indicates: 
• Create a Legal Argument 
• Assess a Legal Argument 
• Refine a Legal Argument 
• Engage in Legal Argumentation 
 
As earlier indicated in Section 1, the phrasing 
involving the word “argument” is construed at both a 
narrow perspective such as an element within a larger 
overall argument, and can also be interpreted as the 
totality of the argument that is being forged. 
 
In brief, an AILA is expected to be able to craft anew a 
legal argument, though this should be understood as 
not necessarily implying “from scratch” per se. In 
other words, a new argument might readily be based 
on prior arguments and not originated from thin air, as 
it were. Thus, the notion of a new argument is one that 
is being created anew versus for example examining 
an existing argument for purposes of assessing the 
argument. In fact, an additional portion of CARE 
involves the assessment of a legal argument. This 
might be undertaken during the crafting of a new 
argument, or it might occur when seeking to discover 
counterarguments as part of an adversarial 
methodology, and so on. Furthermore, it is anticipated 
that an AILA would be able to refine a legal argument, 
receiving as input an existing legal argument, and 
attempt to refine it to bolster its strengths and reduce 
its weaknesses. Finally, an AILA is expected to be 
able to engage in a dialogue regarding a legal 
argumentation. 
 
Note that each of these elements of CARE is 
anticipated to be interleaving with each other and 
though listed as seemingly distinct activities or 
processes are to be considered as intermixing and 
interoperative. 
 
The CARE model can be aligned orthogonally to the 
various stages or layers typified in artificial 
argumentation, such as the research in [3]: “We 
consider the following five main layers: structural, 
relational, dialogical, assessment, and rhetorical. 
Structural layer: How are arguments constructed? 
Relational layer: What are the relationships between 
arguments? Dialogical layer: How can argumentation 
be undertaken in dialogues? Assessment layer: How 
can a constellation of interacting arguments be 
evaluated and conclusions drawn? Rhetorical layer: 
How can argumentation be tailored for an audience so 
that it is persuasive?” 
 
 
3.2 Toulmin’s Formalism of Argumentation 
 
One of the most commonly cited formalisms for 
argumentation consists of the argument structure 
identified by Toulmin [68]. This argument structure is 
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frequently utilized as a core foundation for 
establishing theories and practical tools for legal 
argumentation. 
 
As an example of the reuse of Toulmin’s argument 
structure, consider this research by Marshall [49]: “As 
our representational starting point, we used Toulmin’s 
formalism for logical structure. According to his 
scheme, a datum is some fact or observation about the 
situation under discussion that leads to some further 
observation or fact, the claim. The relation between 
the two is characterized by a rule of inference, a 
warrant, that serves to link the information set forth in 
the datum and claim. A backing supports the warrant 
with some knowledge structure from the argument’s 
domain. A Toulmin argument structure may also 
include various kinds of qualifications of the claim 
(qualifiers) and allow for exceptions (rebuttals). The 
categories provided by this structure are useful for 
expressing portions of argument logic.” 
 
Here is a rationale for making use of Toulmin’s 
argument structure [49]: “What does this work suggest 
about the essential elements of a tool to support the 
formulation, organization, and presentation of 
arguments? First, it suggests that we need a system of 
representations that captures reasoning and allows it to 
be structured by interpretive information. Toulmin 
structures and our current system of representations to 
organize reasoning are a good start. Toulmin structures 
can also function as the input to reasoning analysis 
mechanisms such as assumption-based truth 
maintenance systems. Second, we need a solid 
understanding of the formulation process.” 
 
Figure B-2 indicates the core elements of Toulmin’s 
argument structure. 
 
Figure B-3 augments the core elements of Toulmin’s 
argument structure by emphasizing the importance of 
attack vectors associated with each element, along 
with an overarching attack collective. As earlier 
indicated, robust legal argumentation entails the need 
to consider attacks that can be waged. 
 
Figure B-4 showcases that the Toulmin argument 
structure should be considered as multi-dimensional. A 
legal argument of any substance is likely to have a 
multitude of horizontal layers and also have vertical 
layers. These layers contain sub-arguments. Since 
there is a dependency of the sub-arguments to the 
encompassing argument(s), it is crucial that the sub-
arguments also be given due consideration. There is a 
recursive facility involved in deriving sub-arguments, 
such that there are sub-arguments within sub-
arguments, and so on. 
 
3.3 Four-Square Grid Case Difficulty Comparison 
 
In Figure B-5, a four-square grid of quadrants 
representing case difficulty comparison is presented.  
 
Along the vertical axis are the two major 
classifications of legal cases, consisting of hard cases 
and so-called clear cases. A clear case is denoted as 
one that is relatively routine, readily commonly 
understood, and previously experienced (some refer to 
these as “soft” cases). Hard cases are considered 
arduous to legally extricate and resolve, are usually 
one-off’s that have not previously been experienced, 
etc. [38]. 
 
Along the horizontal axis is the use of a conventional 
argument versus an unconventional argument. When 
combined with the two major classifications of hard 
cases and clear cases, a four-square grid or set of 
quadrants is established and can be utilized 
accordingly. In particular: 
 
• Hard Case – Conventional Argument: 
Unconvincing (Deficient) 
 
• Hard Case – Unconventional Argument: 
Inventive (Formative) 
 
• Clear Case – Conventional Argument: 
Convincing (Expected) 
 
• Clear Case – Unconventional Argument: 
Distended (Exorbitant) 
 
This set of indications is insightful for AILA as to the 
differences between forming legal argumentation in 
the instance of a hard case versus a clear case. Of 
course, it is not necessarily apparent as to whether a 
given case is a hard case or a clear case until sufficient 
assessment has been undertaken. 
 
3.4 Legal Argumentation Cloud Search Space 
 
In Figure B-6, a diagram is used to represent the 
search space involved in examining legal arguments.  
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This is a cloud in the sense that it is a potentially large 
search space that needs to be established and utilized 
by an AILA. While seeking to identify a “winning 
argument” (based on persuasiveness and other 
attributes), there is some n number of possible legal 
arguments that can be potentially (exhaustively) 
identified. There is a need by the AILA to winnow the 
search space to gauge those legal arguments m that are 
considered in the winning realm. These are 
contextually dependent and time-dependent. 
 
3.5 Legal Argumentation and LoA AILR 
 
As shown in Figure B-7, it is useful to align the 
evolution of AI-enablement of Legal Argumentation 
(AILA) with the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI 
Legal Reasoning (AILR).  
 
For each of the levels of autonomy of AI Legal 
Reasoning, the impacts upon legal argumentation will 
be distinctive. A keyword phrasing is used in Figure 
B-7 to indicate these impacts and consists of: 
 
LoA AILR – Legal Argumentation 
Level 0: n/a 
Level 1: Mechanistic (Low) 
Level 2: Mechanistic (High) 
Level 3: Expressive 
Level 4: Domain Fluency 
Level 5: Full Fluency 
Level 6: Meta-Fluency 
 
In brief, at Level 0, which consists of no automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning, the applicability to legal 
argumentation is considered not applicable (“n/a”), 
simply due to the by-definition that there is no AI 
involved at this level. At Level 1, simple assistance 
automation, the characterization is indicated as 
“Mechanistic (Low)” since the AI is abundantly 
unrefined and limited in any substantive practical 
capacity to the legal argumentation advent, thus 
considered mechanistic. At Level 2, advanced 
assistance automation, the characterization is indicated 
as “Mechanistic (High)” since the AI at this level can 
modestly assist in legal argumentation but is 
considered quite preliminary in doing so. 
 
At Level 3, the first substantive impact of AI Legal 
Reasoning comes to work, and this is characterized by 
the keyword of “Expressive” denoting that the AI is 
initially being used as a demonstrative enabler for 
legal argumentation. Maturing at Level 4, the AI Legal 
Reasoning is now substantively augmenting legal 
argumentation, yet does so only within particular legal 
domains, thus this is characterized as being “Domain 
Fluency” in its impact. Upon Level 5, encompassing 
all legal domains, the AI Legal Reasoning has now 
infused across all legal argumentation and 
characterized as now being “Full Fluency” in its scope 
and velocity. Finally, at Level 6, the superhuman AI 
Legal Reasoning, the advent of micro-directives would 
be considered “Meta-Fluency,” though keep in mind 
that Level 6 is a speculative notion and it is not clear 
as to what the superhuman capacity would bring forth. 
 
To reiterate and clarify, these depictions are not 
prescriptive and do not intend to predict what will 
happen, and instead are a form of taxonomy to depict 
and describe what might happen and provide an 
ontological means to understand such phenomena if it 
should so arise. 
 
 
4 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
As earlier indicated, legal argumentation is a vital 
cornerstone of justice, underpinning an adversarial 
form of law, and extensive research has attempted to 
augment or undertake legal argumentation via the use 
of computer-based automation including Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). AI advances in Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) have 
especially furthered the capabilities of leveraging AI 
for aiding legal professionals, doing so in ways that 
are modeled here as CARE, namely Crafting, 
Assessing, Refining, and Engaging in legal 
argumentation.  
 
In addition to AI-enabled legal argumentation serving 
to augment human-based lawyering, an aspirational 
goal of this multi-disciplinary field consists of 
ultimately achieving autonomously effected human-
equivalent legal argumentation. As such, an innovative 
meta-approach has been proposed to apply the Levels 
of Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning (AILR) to 
the maturation of AI and Legal Argumentation 
(AILA), proffering a new means of gauging progress 
in this ever-evolving and rigorously sought domain. 
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Future research is needed to explore in greater detail 
the manner and means by which AI-enablement will 
occur, along with the potential for adverse 
consequences encompassing AI-powered legal 
argumentation. If such AI Legal Argumentation 
(AILA) is to be productively adopted, the full gamut 
of legal, economic, societal, and technological 
ramifications need to be sufficiently examined. 
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